Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts by Ford, Roger Allen
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
1-1-2010
Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on
Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts
Roger Allen Ford
University of New Hampshire School of Law, roger.ford@law.unh.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Econometrics Commons,
Law and Society Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger A. Ford, "Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts," 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377
(2010).
File: FORD - Galley Proof v4.doc Created on: 12/1/2009 5:47:00 PM Last Printed: 12/1/2009 8:39:00 PM 
2010]  377 
 
MODELING THE EFFECTS OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES ON JURY SELECTION  
AND JURY VERDICTS 
Roger Allan Ford* 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys try to shape jury selection by exercising peremptory chal-
lenges (sometimes called peremptory strikes), which allow them to elimi-
nate potential jurors without justification or explanation.1 Peremptory chal-
lenges have long been controversial, and for decades the terms of the debate 
have largely been fixed. Proponents claim that peremptory challenges help 
ensure an impartial jury by permitting attorneys to remove jurors who 
might be biased or predisposed against their side—jurors at the extremes of 
the pool, who will not be able to evaluate the facts fairly and render an im-
partial verdict. The result, proponents say, is a jury composed of jurors in 
the moderate middle, open to both sides and able to come to a fair decision. 
As Justice Scalia wrote for the Supreme Court in Holland v. Illinois2: 
Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most 
partial toward the other side, are a means of “eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both 
sides,” thereby “assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.”3 
  
 * J.D. 2005, The University of Chicago Law School; S.B. 2002, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. Associate, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC. I am indebted to Bernhard Harcourt, 
Hanah Metchis Volokh, Jennifer Berk, Kelsi Brown Corkran, Laurence Claus, Leah Epstein, Lior Stra-
hilevitz, Ryan Foreman, Sasha Volokh, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and discus-
sions; to Judge Terence Evans for his insights on the jury-selection process; and to Judge Frank Easter-
brook for encouraging me to think systematically about this and other problems and giving me the 
opportunity to pursue them. The opinions in this Article are mine alone and should not be attributed to 
my firm or its clients. 
 1  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261-62 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
 3 Id. at 484 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)) (citations omitted). This is, of 
course, not the only justification given for peremptory challenges. William Blackstone argued that they 
give the defendant confidence in the impartiality of the jurors deciding his fate, and that by permitting 
attorneys to challenge jurors without stating a reason, they help avoid offending and potentially biasing 
jurors. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346-47. Barbara Allan Babcock advanced a 
form of the second argument, arguing that peremptory challenges help to “avoid[] trafficking in the core 
of truth in most common stereotypes” by “allow[ing] the covert expression of what we dare not say but 
know is true more often tha[n] not.” Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful 
Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553-54 (1975). 
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The usual response by opponents is that peremptory challenges permit at-
torneys—particularly but not exclusively prosecutors—to discriminate 
based on race, age, gender, employment, or other group characteristics. 
Given the limited information that is typically available about potential 
jurors, a rational attorney must rely on these characteristics and on stereo-
types about jurors with those characteristics.4 This may be entirely rational, 
if these characteristics do have predictive power and attorneys lack better 
information.5 An attorney who is biased against a group, however, might 
target members of that group for elimination, consciously or unconsciously, 
even when it is irrational to do so.6 In either case, because attorneys typical-
ly have little information about potential jurors as individuals, they are 
forced to make decisions based on group characteristics instead.7 The natu-
ral result is discrimination—both animus-based and statistical—and under-
representation of certain groups on juries.8 And the problem may be large 
enough to outweigh any benefits from peremptory challenges; as Justice 
Breyer recognized in 2005, “the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes 
in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more systematized 
than ever before.”9 
These two arguments largely talk past each other. Proponents argue 
that peremptory challenges are beneficial when used properly—that is, 
when based on factors that legitimately may affect or indicate a juror’s view 
of the evidence or willingness to vote for one side or the other—because 
they help ensure an impartial jury, a right protected by the Sixth Amend-
 4 See, e.g., Paul V. Olczak, Martin F. Kaplan & Steven Penrod, Attorneys’ Lay Psychology and 
Its Effectiveness in Selecting Jurors: Three Empirical Studies, 6 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 431, 
440 (1991) (finding that most attorneys rely on two or three stereotypical characteristics when exercis-
ing peremptory challenges). 
 5 Which is not to say that it would be legal; the exercise of peremptory challenges based on 
gender or race violates the Constitution. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) 
(gender); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (race).  
 6 For instance, in the trial at issue in Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1996), va-
cated in part on reh’g, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997), prosecutors and defense attorneys conspired to 
exclude all black jurors. 
 7 See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of 
Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 724 (1991). Lack of individualized information is not the 
only reason attorneys might rely on group characteristics, of course; relying on a small number of heu-
ristics is also simply easier and faster than obtaining individualized data and processing that data to 
reach individualized decisions. See id. at 720. 
 8 The academic discussions of this argument include, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 153, 170 (1989), Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Ab-
olished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 410-13 (1992), and Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harm-
less Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 97-107 (1996). On statis-
tical discrimination and animus-based discrimination, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Anti-
discrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 365 (2008). 
9 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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ment. The opponents mostly do not dispute this, but instead focus on im-
proper use of peremptory challenges, arguing that animus-based discrimi-
nation taints peremptory challenges in practice and, perhaps, inherently. 
The remarkable thing about this debate is that there is almost no evi-
dence that peremptory challenges have the positive effects that proponents 
describe and opponents concede. There are several important assumptions 
packed into the argument for peremptory challenges: that a core middle 
group of impartial jurors actually exists; that each side is able to identify the 
“extreme” jurors; and that the number of such “extreme” jurors is approx-
imately the same as the number of challenges, for example. Some of these 
assumptions are implausible; some are flatly inconsistent with the available 
evidence. And there is essentially no evidence that peremptory challenges 
lead to more impartial juries, even when exercised rationally. 
Complicating efforts to analyze the benefits of peremptory challenges 
are studies showing that attorneys are remarkably bad at exercising them. 
Yet we should expect attorneys to improve in the coming years, benefiting 
from specialized software and the widespread availability of consumer in-
formation and public records about potential jurors. The long-term ques-
tion, then, is whether peremptory challenges can ever result in more impar-
tial juries, and if so how. Simple assertions aside, remarkably little attention 
has been paid to this question. 
This Article aims to mount a new challenge to peremptory challenges 
that looks beyond animus-based discrimination and group characteristics. It 
confronts the argument that peremptory challenges help ensure the selection 
of impartial juries. In fact, even when used rationally, peremptory chal-
lenges cause systematic and idiosyncratic changes to jury composition, po-
tentially leading to biased juries. They can also create juries that are unre-
presentative of the community. These effects can be both systematic, for 
example when juries become more likely on average to vote to convict; 
they can also be idiosyncratic, meaning individual juries can differ wildly 
from other juries selected at the same time from the same population. The 
magnitudes of these effects are highly dependent on the specific procedures 
employed in jury selection, including the number of peremptory challenges 
available to each side, the size of the venire, the amount of information 
available to attorneys, and the process by which eliminated jurors are re-
placed. They are also dependent on community characteristics. In many 
circumstances, peremptory challenges can have a surprisingly large effect 
on jury composition. 
Perhaps most importantly, these systematic and idiosyncratic effects 
are independent of any reliance on group characteristics: even if prosecutors 
and defense attorneys have perfect information about each juror and rely 
solely on that individual information, peremptory challenges are likely to 
result in a more biased jury if they have any effect. In short, even setting 
aside discrimination concerns, peremptory challenges fail to live up to the 
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arguments in their favor; even when used exactly as intended, they likely do 
more harm than good. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the use of peremp-
tory challenges in the United States and the existing literature on their ef-
fectiveness. It describes how peremptory challenges work in practice and 
how states’ practices vary. It next looks at the (rather limited) empirical and 
theoretical literature on how attorneys use challenges. It then examines 
some of the reasons to expect that attorneys will become better at exercising 
peremptory challenges, which means that the theoretical question—what 
would happen if attorneys did know how to exercise challenges effective-
ly?—may be more important in the long term than the empirical question of 
how well they now do so. 
Part II constructs two models to test the effects of peremptory chal-
lenges on jury composition. Peremptory challenges systematically favor 
jurors close to the median of the pool of potential jurors. This has two ef-
fects. First, peremptory challenges can shift the likelihood that the average 
empaneled juror will vote to convict. Second, they can affect the ideologi-
cal and demographic diversity of juries, reducing diversity on individual 
juries but increasing second-order diversity among juries. The likely result 
is that verdicts from juries selected with peremptory challenges will be less 
reliable than verdicts of juries selected randomly.  
Part III discusses some policy implications of these findings for courts 
and legislatures, and then the Article concludes. 
I. THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN JURY TRIALS 
A. How Peremptory Challenges Work 
Though peremptory challenges have a long history10 in criminal cas-
es,11 there has been little consensus about how, precisely, they should be 
implemented. Courts today use a wide variety of challenge procedures, va-
rying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, court to court, and judge to judge. 
  
 10 Peremptory challenges date to the 1100s and the dawn of the jury trial in England. Among the 
excellent histories of peremptory challenges in the English and American systems are JON M. VAN 
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 1-
9 (1977), Broderick, supra note 8, at 371-99, and Roger D. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. 
The English Practice, 16 GEO. L.J. 438 passim (1928). Additionally, Blackstone detailed the eighteenth-
century English practice and gave several justifications for the practice. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
3, at *346-49. 
 11 Peremptory challenges are commonly available in both civil and criminal trials in the United 
States. This Article focuses on their use in criminal cases, both because most of the controversy about 
peremptory challenges concerns their use in criminal cases and because the asymmetric relationship 
between prosecutors and defendants presents some interesting issues. Many of the conclusions are 
equally applicable to peremptory challenges in civil cases. 
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These differences affect even the most basic decisions concerning peremp-
tory challenges: while trial juries have been standardized at twelve people 
since the early days of jury trials,12 the number of peremptory challenges 
allocated to each side has never been consistent across jurisdictions or sta-
ble over time. And while the effects of other procedural variations are less 
obvious than the effects of granting more or fewer peremptory challenges, 
these procedural differences nevertheless can greatly affect jury composi-
tion. 
1. Number of Challenges 
The first major variable affecting a party’s exercise of peremptory 
challenges, of course, is how many challenges are available. States are all 
over the map: some defendants are entitled to as few as one peremptory 
challenge, while others receive as many as twenty-five.13 These numbers are 
typically minimums; frequently courts grant additional challenges for use in 
selecting alternate jurors, to correct an error, or for other discretionary rea-
sons.14 
Though states vary in how many peremptory challenges they grant de-
fendants, several norms are clear. First, almost every state allocates more 
peremptory challenges for more serious crimes.15 Though New York and 
New Jersey (and in a few cases California) grant each side ten peremptory 
challenges in misdemeanor cases,16 nearly all states give each side two to 
six challenges in misdemeanor trials.17 In felony cases, however, each side 
is rarely allocated fewer than six peremptory challenges; ten or more is 
common.18 And while Virginia gives each side in a death penalty trial just 
four peremptory challenges, and Ohio six,19 the vast majority of death-
  
 12 See, e.g., AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 76 
(1922) (“[B]y the middle of the fourteenth century the requirement of twelve [jurors] had probably 
become definitely fixed. Indeed this number finally came to be regarded with something like supersti-
tious reverence.”). There has, however, been movement away from this standard. Six-person criminal 
juries were declared constitutional in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). Thirty-four states use 
juries with fewer than twelve jurors in at least some criminal trials. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. 
STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 233-37 tbl.42 (2006), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf. 
 13 ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 12, at 228 tbl.41. 
 14 See infra notes 25-26. 
 15 ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 12, at 228 tbl.41.  The exceptions are Vermont, which 
gives each side six peremptory challenges in all criminal trials (and, for that matter, all civil trials), id. at 
231 tbl.41, and West Virginia, which gives each side four challenges in misdemeanor cases, but, oddly, 
in felony cases gives the defendant six and the prosecution two, id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. 
 19 Id.  
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penalty states allocate ten, twelve, or more peremptory challenges to each 
side in capital cases.20 Connecticut gives each side twenty-five challenges in 
death penalty cases, while California, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and South Dakota give each side twenty, and Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, 
New Hampshire, and New Jersey give the defense twenty and the prosecu-
tion fewer.21 
Second, the usual practice is to allocate the same number of perempto-
ry challenges to the prosecution as to the defense. Forty states always do so, 
while nine sometimes give the defendant more challenges and Minnesota 
always gives the defendant more.22 None give the defendant fewer peremp-
tory challenges.23 States that sometimes give the defendant more challenges 
always give the extra challenges in more serious crimes: for example, in 
felony trials but not misdemeanors (Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia) or only in capital cases (Delaware and 
New Hampshire).24 
Third, while state law always allocates a certain number of peremptory 
challenges to each side, the actual number of peremptory challenges fre-
quently varies from this allocation. Trial judges often have discretion to 
award extra challenges. Sometimes this discretion is specifically authorized 
by state statute, such as when multiple defendants are tried together or 
when the statute only sets a minimum number of challenges;25 sometimes 
the discretion is conferred by precedent or is a product of harmless error 
analysis.26 Trial judges also sometimes award fewer challenges, either by 
accidentally giving each side fewer challenges than provided by law or by 
erroneously denying a valid challenge for cause (and thus effectively forc-
ing one side to use a peremptory challenge instead).27 Awarding extra chal-
lenges, however, is far more common than not awarding enough, because it 
is sometimes permitted by law and because even when not permitted, attor-
  
 20 Id.  
 21 ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 12, at 228 tbl.41. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.4(f)(1) (requiring the trial court to assemble a strike list of “not 
less than” 18, 24, or 36 potential jurors, depending on the severity of the offense charged); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.350 (giving judges discretion to award additional challenges when the defendant is charged 
with multiple counts or when the defendant demonstrates possible prejudice). 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated in part, 531 
U.S. 1033 (2000); People v. Robinson, 606 N.E.2d 122, 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Johnson v. State, 43 
S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Keller, P.J., concurring). 
 27 See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (finding no constitutional violation when a judge 
erroneously deprived a defendant of challenges he was entitled to by statute, because there was no 
constitutional right to peremptory challenges in the first place). 
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neys do not usually object to receiving extra opportunities to shape the 
jury.28 
A significant effect of these factors, taken together, is that cases ab-
ound in which defendants are accused of serious crimes such as murder or 
rape and in which attorneys exercise dozens and dozens of peremptory 
challenges.29 
2. Challenge Procedures 
As important as the number of peremptory challenges is how they are 
exercised. There are two systems frequently used in the United States: the 
sequential-selection method (also called the strike-and-replace method or 
the jury-box method) and the struck-jury system.30 
The sequential-selection method is the predominant selection proce-
dure in the United States.31 Under that system, enough potential jurors are 
moved into the jury box (from the courtroom gallery, for example) to fill 
the jury (plus, sometimes, slots for alternates).32 The lawyers proceed with 
voir dire; maybe some of the jurors are dismissed for cause or excused for 
personal hardship or other statutory excuses; and then lawyers exercise pe-
remptory challenges.33 Then new potential jurors take the now-empty places 
in the jury box; the lawyers re-run voir dire, excuses, and challenges for 
those jurors; and the cycle continues until a full jury is empaneled.34 
  
 28 See JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE 
OF SELECTING A JURY § 8.01 (2d ed. 1990). 
 29 See, e.g., United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 872 (4th Cir. 1996) (defense exercised fifty-two 
challenges); Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994) (prosecution exercised seventy-three 
challenges and defense seventy-two); Capers v. Singletary, 989 F.2d 442, 444 (11th Cir. 1993) (prosecu-
tion permitted forty peremptory challenges); Denard v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 967 F. Supp. 387, 394 & n.8 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (prosecution exercised forty-one or forty-two challenges); Echlin v. LeCureux, 800 F. 
Supp. 515, 519 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (prosecution allotted twenty-four), rev’d, 995 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 
1993); Wilson v. State, 690 So. 2d 449, 458 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (prosecution exercised forty-one 
challenges), aff’d in part, quashed in part sub nom. Ex parte Wilson, 690 So. 2d 477 (Ala. 1997); 
People v. Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 801-02 (Cal. 1992) (prosecution and defense each exercised forty-one 
challenges). And this is not a recent development. See, e.g., People v. Spies, 12 N.E. 865, 910 (Ill. 1887) 
(defendants exercised 160 challenges), error dismissed sub nom. Ex parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); 
Alfred v. State, 32 Tenn. 581, 582 (1853) (defendants exercised seventy challenges). 
 30 See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 146-47; Richard J. Link, Annotation, Number of and 
Procedure for Exercising Peremptory Challenges Allowed in Federal Criminal Trial for Selection of 
Regular Jurors—Modern Cases, 110 A.L.R. FED. 626, 652-56 (1992). 
 31 See Patterson, 215 F.3d at 780 (noting that the rules of procedure “assume[] that jurors will be 
selected either by the jury-box system or by a struck-jury method”); VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 146 
(stating that two systems of peremptory challenges exist and that the jury box method is the “usual” 
system). 
 32 See Link, supra note 30, at 663. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id. 
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The struck-jury system is used less frequently in the United States.35 
Under that system, voir dire, excuses, and challenges for cause are per-
formed once on the entire panel of potential jurors rather than repeatedly on 
smaller subsets.36 At that point, enough potential jurors are left for each side 
to exercise their peremptory challenges and still leave a full jury—and, 
ideally, no more.37 (So, for example, if each side gets ten challenges, and 
the jury is twelve people, at least thirty-two potential jurors are needed.) 
Then, considering the panel as a whole, the parties exercise their chal-
lenges.38 If more than twelve jurors remain, the jury can be selected ran-
domly,39 the first twelve jurors can be empaneled,40 or the parties can be 
given additional peremptory challenges.41 
A key difference between the two methods, then, is how much infor-
mation an attorney exercising a challenge has about a replacement juror. 
Under the struck-jury system, the attorney will have already seen and ex-
amined the entire panel and so can compare a potential juror to the rest of 
that panel; under the sequential-selection system, the replacement is un-
known. (Of course, if the panel is seated in the courtroom, the attorney may 
be able to draw inferences from the replacement’s appearance, reading ma-
terial, and so forth. But such appearances provide relatively limited infor-
mation compared to the questions asked during voir dire.) 
Another difference between the two methods is that the struck-jury 
system can result in larger effective panels, since all potential jurors are 
examined before any are eliminated. In contrast, under the sequential-
selection method, only those who are needed are examined. So, for exam-
ple, if eighty potential jurors are called for a trial and each side is allowed 
ten peremptory challenges, then only thirty-two of the eighty potential ju-
rors are needed under the sequential-selection method. This makes peremp-
tory challenges potentially much more powerful in the sequential-selection 
method, since peremptory challenges can eliminate a greater fraction of 
potential jurors. 
A third difference concerns the calculation an attorney exercising pe-
remptory challenges must make when deciding whether to challenge a po-
tential juror. Under the struck-jury system, the decision whether to use a 
peremptory challenge on a juror is conceptually easy: with j challenges, a 
  
 35 See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 146. 
 36 Kathleen M. McKenna, Jury Trial Issues, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
PRACTICE 2009, at 527-28 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-795, 2009). 
 37 McKenna, supra note 36, at 527-28; VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 146-47. 
 38 McKenna, supra note 36, at 527-28; VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 147. 
 39 See, e.g. United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 778-79 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing the trial 
court’s random selection after peremptory challenges were complete), vacated in part, 531 U.S. 1033 
(2000). 
 40 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 234 (empanelling the first twelve names on the list who have not been 
struck). 
 41 See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350(e) (allowing for additional peremptory challenges). 
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lawyer should strike the j least-preferred members of the jury pool. Setting 
aside questions of how much attorneys can really learn about potential ju-
rors, the comparison in the struck-jury method is between known quantities: 
an individual potential juror versus the (known) rest of the pool. The choice 
is risk-free. 
Things are more complicated under the sequential-selection system, 
both because the replacement for an eliminated juror is unknown and be-
cause there is an order to the jurors (even if only implicit) that is not present 
in the struck-jury system. Since no direct comparison is possible, attorneys 
exercising challenges must compare a potential juror to the population of all 
potential jurors. 
Because the number of peremptory challenges and the size of the jury 
are fixed, the total size of the sequential-selection jury pool is fixed: if each 
side gets ten challenges, for example, and the jury includes twelve people, 
then a maximum of thirty-two potential jurors need be considered (ignoring 
alternates). This is 2j + x, where x is the number of jurors who will be em-
paneled. (The initial pool will need to be larger if jurors are excused or 
dismissed for cause. But because peremptory challenges are typically exer-
cised after the court handles other dismissals, those potential jurors should 
not affect attorneys’ decision making.) 
An attorney deciding whether to challenge a potential juror in the first 
set of jurors called up, then, must decide whether that juror is likely to be 
one of the j worst of those 2j + x potential jurors. Without other informa-
tion, a risk-neutral attorney looking at the first group would challenge a 
potential juror only if that juror is in the bottom j(2 jx )  of the total potential 
juror population.42 After a few rounds of challenges, however, the numbers 
change: if both sides have accepted ten jurors out of twelve slots and each 
side has two peremptory challenges remaining, for example, then the court 
will fill the last two slots from six possible jurors. An attorney should there-
fore strike a potential juror if that juror is in the least preferred third of the 
population. (This is the same j(2 jx )  calculation, except that the number of 
open jury slots (x) and remaining peremptory challenges for each side (j) 
change as jurors are chosen.) 
Compared to the relative certainty of the struck-jury system, the uncer-
tainty of the sequential-selection method has two distinct effects: first, chal-
lenging a juror is risky, in that the replacement may be even worse;43 and 
  
 42 A complicating factor is that x of those 2j + x potential jurors are known: the jurors that have 
already been seated and subjected to voir dire. The real question an attorney should ask, then, is how 
likely a potential juror is to be in the bottom j of x known jurors and 2j unknown jurors, given some 
population distribution for the pool of possible unknown jurors—a rather complicated calculation for an 
attorney in the middle of jury selection. 
 43 The risk of the sequential-selection procedure was described in North Carolina Lawyers Week-
ly: 
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second, the balance changes of how bad a potential juror must be to merit 
striking. For example, a juror who would have been challenged had she 
appeared early in the draw might make the jury if she comes later and a 
lawyer is running out of challenges; the reverse is equally plausible. 
One final complication in evaluating the effects of challenge proce-
dures is that both the sequential system and the struck-jury system give the 
trial judge or court considerable leeway to vary the precise procedures em-
ployed. Even when using the more certain struck-jury system, potential 
variables include how many jurors are in the pool; whether excess jurors 
will be eliminated randomly or by extra peremptory challenges; whether the 
potential jurors will be ordered (thus permitting attorneys to concentrate 
their challenges on those most likely to get selected44) or not; and how al-
ternates, if any, are selected.45 For the sequential-selection method, add to 
  
The gambling problem of the current system was the subject that came up during my 
most recent monthly lunch with my good friend Boxer Haynes, Esq., North Carolina’s most 
grizzled trial attorney. Grumbling even more than usual into his beard, he sat to join me. 
“Now what?” I asked. He’d just come from voir diring a med[ical] mal[practice] case 
against a cardiologist. 
“I got rid of a nurse. Her replacement? A physician’s husband. I struck the physician’s 
husband. Replacement? A cardiology student. I’m out of strikes. I want the nurse back.” 
Susan O’Malley, Tips & Strategies—The “Struck System” of Jury Selection, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 3, 
1997. 
 44 See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 314 A.2d 727, 730-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). With one juror left 
to be chosen, the defendant had three peremptory challenges remaining, and the prosecution had none. 
Id. at 731. To that point, potential jurors had been accepted or rejected in the order they were listed on 
the court’s jury list. Id. at 730-31. Thirteen names remained on the list, and the defendant concluded that 
the fourth juror on the list was preferable to the first three. Id. at 731. So the defense challenged the first 
three jurors listed, at which point the clerk skipped past three names and called the seventh person on 
the list, who was seated. Id. 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 778-79, 784 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated in part, 
531 U.S. 1033 (2000). The appeal came after a five-month-long, fifteen-defendant drug conspiracy trial. 
Id. at 778, 784. The trial court used the struck-jury system. With a twelve-person jury, eight alternates, 
twenty-two peremptory challenges distributed among the various defendants, and fourteen for the prose-
cution, a pool of fifty-six potential jurors was required after excuses and challenges for cause. Sixty-
three potential jurors remained at that point, however, all of whom the trial court left in the jury pool 
without establishing any order or priority. After the parties exercised their allotted peremptory chal-
lenges, and then additional challenges to make up for duplicates, thirty-one potential jurors remained. 
The clerk randomly selected twelve of those thirty-one to sit as the jury; alternates were selected ran-
domly from the remaining nineteen after another round of challenges. Id. at 778-79. 
The defendants argued on appeal that this procedure contained numerous errors: (1) The pool con-
tained sixty-three potential jurors instead of the fifty-six required, reducing the strength of their peremp-
tory challenges; (2) the pool was unordered, preventing the defendants from targeting potential jurors 
who were most likely to serve; (3) the court empaneled eight alternates instead of the six permitted by 
procedural rule, reducing the effectiveness of the defendants’ peremptory challenges in selecting alter-
nates; and (4) the court gave each side only two peremptory challenges for use in selecting alternates, 
instead of the three permitted by the rules. Id. at 779. 
The defendants had case law or statutory support for each claim of error: the first two had been held 
previously to be reversible error, and the latter two were contrary to the rules. Yet the appellate court 
found no reversible error, because there was no indication the jury was not impartial. Id. 
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this list what (if anything) attorneys know about replacement jurors: if, for 
example, replacements are drawn from the gallery in seating order, then 
attorneys might have limited information about potential jurors (sex, race, 
approximate age, perhaps information from jurors’ style of dress or reading 
material) even before those jurors have answered voir dire. 
One of these frequently discretionary decisions judges make turns out 
to be quite important to jury selection outcomes: whether or not the jury 
pool is placed in a specific order before the attorneys exercise their chal-
lenges. Consider a struck-jury selection in which each side has twelve pe-
remptory challenges and the total pool consists of sixty potential jurors. If 
the potential jurors are ordered, then only the first thirty-six jurors have any 
chance of being selected46 (ignoring excuses and challenges for cause, 
which usually are handled before peremptory challenges). Each side, then, 
will use its peremptory challenges on the twelve least-preferable members 
of that set of thirty-six potential jurors—in other words, the bottom third of 
a thirty-six-member jury pool. If the potential jurors are not ordered, how-
ever, then all sixty potential jurors have a chance of being selected; the par-
ties will still use their challenges on the twelve least-preferable members of 
the pool, but each side will only be able to eliminate a fifth of the full sixty-
member pool. When the potential jurors are ordered, the lawyers can focus 
on a smaller jury pool, and have a correspondingly larger ability to shape 
the jury with the same number of challenges. 
B. The Existing Evidence on the Effectiveness of Peremptory Challenges 
Given the various purported benefits of peremptory challenges, the in-
consistent ways they are implemented, and the difficulty of studying actual 
jurors, it is not surprising that little empirical work exists concerning the 
effects of peremptory challenges.47 Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Di-
  
 46 This “effective venire size” will be a key variable in Part II, infra. 
 47 Nor, for that matter, has there been much theoretical work on their benefits. Instead, the vast 
majority of writing about peremptory challenges falls into two categories: (1) discussion of the relation-
ship between peremptory challenges and discrimination, see, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 156-57, 
163; Broderick, supra note 8, at 370-71; Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are 
From Mars, Judges Are from Venus, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 135, 138-39 (2000); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond 
Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1077-83 (1995); 
Muller, supra note 8, at 96-97; Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance 
Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 162; cf. Babcock, supra 
note 3, at 553 (“The peremptory [challenge], made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the 
core of truth in most common stereotypes.”); and (2) practical advice for trial lawyers on how to exer-
cise challenges effectively, based mostly on experience, anecdote, and stereotype, see, e.g., Solomon M. 
Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific 
Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 229 passim (1990) (reviewing the “folklore” of jury 
selection techniques);VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 72-78 (1986). 
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amond performed the most influential empirical study of peremptory chal-
lenges.48 They assembled mock juries for twelve actual criminal trials in 
Chicago.49 Half of the mock jurors were potential jurors attorneys had pe-
remptorily challenged, while the other half were selected at random from 
potential jurors who did not go through voir dire.50 Those mock juries then 
sat through the trials and deliberated; their initial votes and eventual ver-
dicts were compared to the actual juries’.51 
The study concluded that attorneys are surprisingly ineffective at exer-
cising peremptory challenges.52 On a scale of –100 to +100, where –100 
represents the worst possible exercise of peremptory challenges (challeng-
ing those jurors most likely to vote for the challenger’s side) and +100 
represents the best possible exercise, prosecutors averaged –0.5, meaning 
they had essentially no effect overall.53 Defense attorneys did better, averag-
ing +17.0, but nevertheless fell well short of good performance.54 Even the 
defense attorneys’ relatively stronger performance was not statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level, meaning that there is a greater than 5% chance that 
their performance was coincidental.55 
While the average effect was small, attorneys’ performance was suffi-
ciently erratic that large swings were produced in individual cases.56 Prose-
cutors’ performance in individual cases varied between –61 and +62; de-
fense attorneys’ varied between –62 and +48.57 And these shifts did change 
the probability that the empaneled jury would vote to convict, compared to 
the control juries: with large swings by one side or the other, prosecutors 
and defense attorneys could accidentally combine to wildly swing the jury 
composition in any individual case.58 Indeed, this happened in two of the 
twelve cases Zeisel and Diamond studied.59 In those cases, the combination 
of the prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ challenges produced changes in 
  
 48 Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and 
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978). 
 49 Id. at 492-93. 
 50 Id. at 498-99. 
 51 Id. at 506-08. 
 52 Id. at 516-17. 
 53 Id. at 515-17. 
 54 Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 48, at 516-17. 
 55 Zeisel and Diamond did not calculate the statistical significance of their results, but they pro-
vided all the data in their article, permitting a one-sample t test to be performed. See id. at 516 tbl.9. 
With a hypothetical mean of 0, that test gives a two-tailed p-value of 0.0997. This means that the null 
hypothesis, that the average score of defense attorneys in the population is 0, cannot be rejected at the 
5% confidence level, but can be (barely) rejected at the 10% confidence level. See generally ALAN 
AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 143-47 (4th ed., 
Prentice Hall 2009) (describing tests for statistical significance). 
 56 Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 48, at 516-17. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 517. 
 59 Id. at 507 tbl.4, 509 tbl.5, 517. 
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the probability of a guilty verdict of –30% and –72%.60 In both cases, the 
outcome was a not-guilty verdict, which the judge called “without merit.”61 
In one case, the jury selected without challenges would have had eight 
votes to convict and four votes to acquit; with challenges that proportion 
was reversed.62 
Studies of how attorneys exercise peremptory challenges shed some 
light on this poor performance. Michael O. Finkelstein and Bruce Levin 
studied sixteen federal criminal trials in New York in which prosecutors 
and defense attorneys submitted their peremptory challenges simultaneous-
ly.63 By studying how often potential jurors were challenged by both sides 
(a surprisingly common occurrence, especially considering it should rarely 
happen if attorneys know what they are doing), the authors were able to 
construct two models dividing the population of potential jurors into those 
who were “clear choices” to challenge—jurors most attorneys would agree 
are likely to be biased against a specific side—and those who were mere 
“guesses,” about whom attorneys would disagree.64 The authors concluded 
that almost all challenges are guesses, indicating that attorneys have very 
little sense of who is worth challenging.65 
Studies also show that attorneys rely on a small number of stereotypes 
or heuristics in exercising their challenges—and, interestingly, that these 
characteristics differ across cultures.66 One study found, for example, that 
the stereotypes attorneys relied on in Australia bore little resemblance to 
those used in the United States.67 For instance, Australian defense attorneys 
used peremptory challenges to strike younger, casually dressed potential 
jurors, contrary to the usual advice in the United States.68 While this may be 
rational, if casually dressed younger Americans tend to favor the defense 
while those in Australia tend to favor the prosecution, the other possible 
explanation is more troubling: that attorneys in the United States and Aus-
tralia have just adopted different, opposing stereotypes without any real 
basis. 
There are at least three possible explanations for attorneys’ reliance on 
broad stereotypes rather than individualized information. One explanation, 
of course, would be (conscious or unconscious) animus-based discrimina-
  
 60 These shifts occurred in Cases Four and Twelve. Id. 
 61 Id. at 509 tbl.5. 
 62 This occurred in Case Twelve. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 48, at 507 tbl.4. 
 63 Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Clear Choices and Guesswork in Peremptory Chal-
lenges in Federal Criminal Trials, 160 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y A 275, 277-79 (1997). 
 64 Id. at 276-77, 279-84. 
 65 Id. at 281, 284. 
 66 See, e.g., Fulero & Penrod, supra note 47, at 230-37; Hastie, supra note 7, at 706-10; Olczak, 
Kaplan & Penrod, supra note 4, at 431-40. 
 67 See Glenn F. Ross, The Selection of Jurors in the Higher Courts of Queensland, 15 AUSTL. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 351, 357 (1980). 
 68 Id. at 355. 
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tion. A second possible explanation, however, is that jurors’ votes may vary 
predictably with race, sex, socioeconomic status, and other demographic 
variables. Indeed, studies have confirmed that likelihood of convicting does 
correlate with demographic variables.69 But even attorneys who take scien-
tific approaches in using these variables have had limited success.70 
The third possible explanation is that even in cases where demograph-
ics have little or no predictive power, there may be little else to go on.71 
Voir dire is typically limited to a questionnaire or brief questioning in court, 
and there is only so much an attorney can find out about a potential juror in 
even several hours of questioning—let alone about dozens of potential ju-
rors.72 As one study concluded: “Voir dire was grossly ineffective not only 
in weeding out ‘unfavorable’ jurors but even in eliciting the data which 
would have shown particular jurors as very likely to prove ‘unfavorable.’”73 
With little else to go on, attorneys rely on stereotypes. 
One final statistical finding is worth noting. Johnson and Haney found 
that in the usual case, voir dire and peremptory challenges tend to “homo-
genize the composition of the jury that results”: at least with respect to the 
demographic characteristics that the attorneys considered relevant, chal-
lenges tended to be exercised on potential jurors who were at the extremes 
of those demographic dimensions.74 Juries, then, were less representative of 
the population as a whole, and more homogenous, than were the venires 
they were drawn from.75 
C. The Future of Peremptory Challenges 
Zeisel and Diamond determined that in some criminal trials, perempto-
ry challenges do matter: when one side made significantly more effective 
use of its challenges than the other side, the resulting shift in the views of 
  
 69 See, e.g., William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black 
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 171, 190-203 (2001); Hubert S. Feild, Juror Background Characteristics and Attitudes To-
ward Rape: Correlates of Jurors’ Decisions in Rape Trials, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 82-91 (1978) 
(discussing the predictability of jurors’ votes in rape cases). 
 70 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and 
Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 183 (1990). 
 71 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory 
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1126 (1994); Marvin Zalman & Olga 
Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 
292-98 (2005). 
 72 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 47, at 67-76.  
 73 Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 505 
(1965). 
 74 Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and 
Effect, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 499-500 (1994). 
 75 Id. at 500. 
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the jury could affect the outcome of the trial.76 This result leads to some 
obvious follow-ups: Do peremptory challenges affect trial outcomes when 
both sides are equally effective in exercising those challenges? What are the 
effects on jury composition when both sides make good use of their chal-
lenges? And are these effects good or bad? 
Though attorneys are bad at exercising peremptory challenges, there 
are reasons to think they may improve in the future. There is always the 
possibility that developments in the psychological literature will give law-
yers better insights to use in exercising peremptory challenges. But addi-
tionally, two recent technological developments make it easier for attorneys 
to exercise peremptory challenges effectively. 
The first technological development that may help attorneys exercise 
peremptory challenges more effectively is computer software that makes 
scientific jury selection methods available at a much lower cost. Traditional 
scientific jury selection, as practiced in high-profile trials since the 1970s, 
compares potential jurors’ demographic characteristics to the results of lo-
cal opinion surveys and mock trial exercises.77 For example, if opinion sur-
veys determine that older men are more likely than younger women to 
sympathize with a defendant, the defense attorney facing an older man and 
a younger woman would challenge the woman. (This is basically using ste-
reotypes, except the stereotypes are tested for statistical validity before use.) 
There are significant doubts about the effectiveness of scientific jury selec-
tion methods,78 and jury consultants today focus more on making attorneys’ 
presentations persuasive rather than helping select juries.79 Nevertheless, to 
the extent traditional scientific jury selection methods are effective—and 
there is some evidence that they have a limited effect80—their primary dis-
advantage is cost. Surveys and mock trials are often practical only in impor-
tant or high profile cases. And these methods have not given generalizable 
results that could apply to many cases.81 
New software may help change that. The most prominent example is 
JuryQuest, a software package that became available in 2005.82 Instead of 
comparing potential jurors’ demographic characteristics to the results of 
  
 76 See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 48, at 518-19. 
 77 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 47, at 79-94. 
 78 See, e.g., M. Juliet Bonazzoli, Note, Jury Selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes 
Through Science, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 247, 296-305 (1998) (finding that the scientific process for 
jury selection is more effective than the conventional method); Diamond, supra note 70, at 178-83; 
Fulero & Penrod, supra note 47, at 244-51; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 47, at 89-92. 
 79 Diamond, supra note 70, at 182-83. 
 80 See, e.g., Bonazzoli, supra note 78, at 297-99; Diamond, supra note 70, at 180; Fulero & Pe-
nrod, supra note 47, at 243-53. 
 81 See Diamond, supra note 70, at 180. 
 82 Jeff Horwitz, Jury-Rigging: Can a Computer Pick a Better Jury Than a High-Priced Consul-
tant?, SLATE, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2147351; JuryQuest Home Page, http://juryquest. 
com (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
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local surveys, the software compares seven demographic variables—age, 
sex, race, education, occupation, marital status, and prior jury service—to a 
massive database of survey questionnaires and prior jury outcomes.83 The 
idea is that juror attitudes are predictable in mine-run cases; case-specific 
surveys and mock-trial exercises may not be needed.84 This significantly 
reduces costs, to a few hundred or thousand dollars per trial, compared to 
tens of thousands of dollars for traditional jury consulting.85 Public defender 
offices in California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas use JuryQuest.86 Its 
maker claims impressive results in cases where the package is used, includ-
ing an acquittal rate of 50% in criminal trials, though no independent stu-
dies have evaluated the company’s claims.87 
The second technological development that may help attorneys exer-
cise challenges more effectively is the growing availability of large data-
bases of consumer and public information. This information comes in a 
variety of forms: public records such as property tax and vehicle registra-
tion records; membership lists from churches, college alumni groups, and 
various clubs; magazine and catalog subscription lists; travel records such 
as frequent flier account statements; and supermarket discount card records, 
for example. Some of these data sources are less accessible than others—
credit reports are generally protected and federal privacy laws protect health 
records—while other sources of information are commercially available.88 
Consumer information has been used extensively in politics: candidates and 
parties use it to identify likely supporters.89 Similarly, marketers rely on 
  
 83 See Augustina Guerrero, Attorneys: Jury Still Out on Computer-Aided Process, ORLANDO BUS. 
J., Sept. 11, 2006, http://orlando.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/2006/09/11/story11.html; see also 
JuryQuest Home Page, supra note 82. The Batson implications of this technology are unclear. Jury-
Quest’s scores are based in part on race and gender, but the software perfectly separates statistical dis-
crimination from animus-based discrimination, undercutting Batson’s rationale, since demographics 
affect scores only when they have predictive power. See James R. Gadwood, Note, The Framework 
Comes Crumbling Down: JuryQuest In A Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 292, 306-09 (2008). 
 84 See Gadwood, supra note 83, at 291-94.  
 85 See id. at 306. 
 86 See JuryQuest Testimonials Page, http://juryquest.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=37&Itemid=69 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
 87 See About JuryQuest Software Page, http://juryquest.com/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=58&Itemid=84 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
 88 See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, Democrats, Playing Catch-Up, Tap Database to Target Potential 
Voters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2006, at A1; Jon Gertner, The Very, Very Personal Is the Political, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, § 6, at 43. 
 89 See, e.g., DOUGLAS B. SOSNICK, MATTHEW J. DOWD & RON FOURNIER, APPLEBEE’S AMERICA: 
HOW SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL, BUSINESS, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONNECT WITH THE NEW 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 33-51 (2006); Dreazen, supra note 88; Michael D. Shear, Va. Gubernatorial 
Hopefuls Use Data to Zero In on Voters, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2005, at C1; David Von Drehle, No 
Stone Is Left Unturned for Turnout; Tight Contest Fires Up Faithful in Record Push for Votes, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 7, 2000, at A1. 
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consumer data to identify targets.90 
No comprehensive database of consumer information has yet been 
marketed for use in jury selection; nor have the correlation studies neces-
sary to make use of such data in jury selection been performed. Politicians 
and political parties have done similar work,91 though there has not been 
independent verification of their effectiveness. But there is little reason to 
think these methods will not eventually come to jury selection as well. 
The combination of these two advances could significantly change 
how jury selection is performed. The biggest limitation of a program like 
JuryQuest is the set of variables the software considers. Though those va-
riables may have some predictive power, they are inevitably limited; more 
information can only help. While JuryQuest might be able to say that, on 
average, a thirty-five-year-old Korean-American engineer will vote to con-
vict a certain percent of the time, knowing that she reads The Nation, drives 
a hybrid car, and shops at Whole Foods might refine that prediction. Tradi-
tionally, some of these variables could be revealed through voir dire or 
through private investigation of potential jurors, but judges usually do not 
allow protracted voir dire examination and investigations are far too expen-
sive for most trials. Consumer databases could make this information avail-
able to attorneys in all sorts of cases. 
The enduring question, then, is what effect peremptory challenges can 
have—that is, what effect they would have if attorneys exercised them ra-
tionally, effectively, and with full information. This paper aims to help an-
swer that question.  
II. MODELING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
A. Introduction to the Models 
1. Procedures Tested 
There are three possible jury selection procedures to test: a sequential-
selection method, an ordered struck-jury system, and an unordered struck-
jury system. The first two procedures, however, are basically the same: in 
each case the venire is effectively limited to the first 2j + x potential ju-
rors.92 The difference is that the sequential-selection method involves a de-
gree of risk that is absent from the ordered struck-jury system, since the 
replacement for a challenged juror is unknown. That risk makes the optimal 
  
 90 See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Political Device Goes Corporate, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2007, at 
A6. 
 91 See, e.g., Dreazen, supra note 88; Gertner, supra note 88; Shear, supra note 89. 
 92 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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strategy much more complicated, since the threshold at which a potential 
juror should be challenged changes during the course of the selection.93 
Litigants are also unlikely to be risk-neutral, which increases the complexi-
ty.94 The ideal jury outcome from each system, however, given a particular 
ordered venire, should be the same. Because of the uncertainty and com-
plexity in modeling the sequential-selection method and its basic equiva-
lence to the ordered struck-jury method, this Article will test the two varie-
ties of struck juries. 
2. Effects Evaluated 
This Article evaluates two ways peremptory challenges could affect 
jury composition. 
First, what are the effects of peremptory challenges on the probability 
that empaneled jurors and juries will vote to convict or acquit? If perempto-
ry challenges change the average juror’s likelihood of voting to convict, 
then trial outcomes will likewise change with the jury selection method 
employed. This would cast doubt on the legitimacy of jury verdicts: if ver-
dicts can be changed simply by varying the number of peremptory chal-
lenges or how they are exercised, then how confident can one be that a 
jury’s verdict is correct? 
Second, what are the effects of peremptory challenges on the distribu-
tion (both ideological and demographic) of jurors empaneled on any partic-
ular jury and on different juries? Two juries may have the same average 
probability of voting to convict but nevertheless behave differently as 
groups if one group has jurors who have similar probabilities of voting to 
convict and the other has a wide range of jurors. Similarly, demographics 
can affect jury deliberations.95 All else being equal, then, we should prefer 
selection methods that preserve the distribution of the pool of potential ju-
rors. 
A related question concerns the predictability of jury selection. Can a 
selection procedure, drawing from the same population, produce two wildly 
  
 93 See, e.g., Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic 
Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 26 OPERATIONS RES. 966, 989 (1978) (discussing an 
algorithm for exercising peremptory challenges). 
 94 For example, faced with the choice in jury selection between a known potential juror who is, 
say, 40% likely to vote to convict, or an unknown replacement juror drawn from the population of 
potential jurors, a risk-neutral attorney will challenge the known potential juror if the unknown potential 
jurors are, on average, more favorable to the attorney’s side than the known potential juror—even if 
only slightly more favorable. If the attorney is risk-averse, however, then she will be reluctant to gamble 
that the unknown alternative will be better than the known potential juror. A risk-averse defense attor-
ney, then, might not take the risk unless the replacement jurors average less than 35% or 30% likely to 
vote to convict. 
 95 See infra Part III.B. 
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divergent juries? In other words, how great is the second-order diversity of 
juries?96 Unpredictability makes jury trials riskier and could make trial out-
comes less reliable, since it increases the effects of random variation in jury 
composition. 
3. Attorneys’ Knowledge 
A variety of assumptions can be made about what knowledge attor-
neys have when exercising peremptory challenges. Different assumptions 
can lead to different behavior by attorneys and thus produce different out-
comes. To test these different assumptions, this Article employs two models 
of jury selection. 
In the first model, attorneys know how likely an individual potential 
juror is to vote to convict in criminal cases generally, but do not know how 
likely that potential juror is to vote to convict in any particular case. This is 
essentially the JuryQuest approach, taken to extremes: by comparing an 
individual potential juror to a comprehensive database of votes in a large 
number of trials, an attorney could predict how often that potential juror 
would vote to convict. Accordingly, in this model, each juror is represented 
by the probability that he or she will vote to convict in a random criminal 
trial. The model assumes that each attorney knows this probability for each 
potential juror and acts rationally, striking potential jurors who are less like-
ly to vote for the attorney’s preferred outcome. 
The second model assumes that attorneys also have case-specific 
knowledge. Attorneys will sometimes be able to tell not only how often a 
potential juror would vote to convict, but also in which kinds of cases that 
juror would vote to convict. A potential juror who would vote to convict in 
60% of cases might be predictably more sympathetic to defendants in drug 
cases and less sympathetic in rape cases. This sort of information might be 
available through a JuryQuest-type database that contained breakdowns 
based on type of case. When this information is available, attorneys can 
predict not just the probability that a potential juror will vote to convict, but 
(with greater or lesser degrees of accuracy) what that potential juror’s vote 
will be in a particular case. The second model thus assumes that every po-
tential juror’s vote can be predicted accurately and precisely in any given 
case. Potential jurors are divided into those who will vote to convict and 
those who will vote to acquit. The model assumes that each attorney knows 
which group each potential juror is in and exercises peremptory challenges, 
when possible, to strike potential jurors who will vote against the attorney’s 
preferred outcome. 
  
 96 I borrow the term from Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1102-03 (2005) (discussing the advantages of diversity among decision-making bodies such as juries). 
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B. A Probability Model of Jurors and Jury Selection 
1. Motivating the Model 
Imagine a random potential juror in an armed robbery trial. Several 
factors might affect that juror’s willingness to vote to convict. Obviously, 
details of the specific case should matter: How good is the evidence? Is 
there surveillance camera footage, or an eyewitness? Were fingerprints 
found? Was the defendant caught with stolen goods, or at the scene? Is 
there an alibi, or a motive? 
There are also factors that can affect a juror’s willingness to convict 
that are unrelated to any specific case. Maybe a juror has been a crime vic-
tim and is unsympathetic to criminal defendants. Maybe a juror has been 
falsely accused and is suspicious of police. Maybe a juror has law-and-
order political beliefs. Maybe a juror watches television crime dramas and 
expects perfect forensic evidence in every case.97 Maybe a juror is less 
sympathetic to defendants of one race. 
Each juror’s vote to convict or acquit in an individual case thus de-
pends on a great variety of case-specific and case-independent factors. A 
potential juror’s votes across all possible cases determine the probability 
that she would vote to convict after hearing the evidence in a random case. 
And since such a probability exists for each potential juror, a probability 
distribution can be constructed for all potential jurors in the population. 
Using that distribution, the effects of various jury selection schemes can be 
modeled. 
The model approximates the probability distribution of potential jurors 
with a beta distribution, with the shape parameters Į = 5 and ȕ = 4. (The 
beta distribution used in the model, with Į = 5 and ȕ = 4, is shown in Figure 
1.) The distribution is given by the equation 
 




in which the independent variable x represents an individual potential ju-
ror’s likelihood of voting to convict in a random criminal trial; the function 
  
 97 The “CSI effect” has become a problem for prosecutors as juries demand more and more foren-
sic evidence even in simple cases. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 17, 2005; Richard Willing, “CSI Effect” Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 
5, 2004. The effect may have been responsible for the acquittal of actor Robert Blake of murder: jurors 
noted that Blake had “not one particle” of gunshot residue on his clothes after the shooting. Roane, 
supra. Some prosecutors have responded by calling “negative evidence witnesses,” who “try to assure 
jurors that it is not unusual for real crime-scene investigators to fail to find DNA, fingerprints and other 
evidence at crime scenes.” Willing, supra. 
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f describes the proportion of potential jurors who fall near x; and the norma-
lization constant B is given by 
 
B(D ,E)  tD1(1 t)E1dt
0
1
³  (D 1)!(E 1)!(D  E 1)! .
  
Although there is no source of empirical information that would ap-
proximate the real-world distribution of potential jurors,98 this beta distribu-
tion has two features that make it particularly suitable for testing the effects 
of peremptory challenges. First, the vast majority of jurors are somewhere 
in the middle—possibly convicting, possibly not, depending on case-
specific factors. There may be people who would almost always convict or 
almost always acquit, but they probably make up a relatively small portion 
of the population. There are nevertheless differences between jurors: a juror 
who is 40% likely to convict in a random trial and one 60% likely to con-
vict may both be weighing the evidence carefully and with equal attention 
to their responsibilities as jurors, but the 40% juror is somewhat more skep-
tical of the government’s case. 
Second, the distribution is not centered at 50%. This is realistic: there 
is little reason to expect a real population to be perfectly neutral between 
the prosecution and defense. This factor will vary from community to 
community: urban jurors may be less willing to convict, for example, than 
suburban jurors.99 And asymmetry enables testing whether peremptory chal-
lenges result in systematic distortions: if, for example, the average potential 
juror is 60% likely to vote to convict, but the average empaneled juror is 
70% likely to vote to convict, then the selection procedure is biasing juries. 
  
 98 One obvious approach would be to compare conviction rates with jury demographics and con-
struct an approximation based on demographics of the population. There are two problems with this 
approach: (1) juries are made up of members of a population who actually show up and make it through 
jury selection (including excuses, challenges for cause, and peremptory challenges) rather than a random 
sample of the population, which, as the model shows, see infra Part II.B.3, makes a significant differ-
ence in the distribution of jurors empaneled; and (2) jury verdicts are a product not only of the individu-
al jurors’ initial votes, but of group deliberations, see infra Part III.2. 
 99 See, e.g., SHAWN M. FLOWER, ABELL FOUND., DISPARITIES IN JURY OUTCOMES: BALTIMORE 
CITY VS. THREE SURROUNDING JURISDICTIONS—AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1, 2 (2008), available 
at http://www.abell.org/pubsitems/Disparities-cj.908.pdf. 
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Figure 1. The beta distribution. A sample beta distribution is shown with the shape parame-
ters a = 5 and b = 4. The figure is normalized so the shaded area equals 1. The mean is at 
x = 0.556, with the peak at x = 0.571 and the median at x = 0.559. For a population modeled 
by this curve, then, the average person is 55.6% likely to convict. Additionally, 36.3% of 
people are less than 50% likely to vote to convict; 63.7% of people are more than 50% likely 
to vote to convict. Very few people are truly partial: just 2.1% of people are more than 85% 
likely to vote to convict, for example, and 0.3% are less than 15% likely to convict. 
2. Constructing and Applying the Model 
The model assumes that during jury selection, each side eliminates 
those jurors who are most likely to vote against that side; prosecutors will 
challenge those potential jurors with the smallest probabilities of voting to 
convict, while defense attorneys will challenge those with the largest prob-
abilities.100 Each side will also limit challenges to those jurors who actually 
have a chance of being selected. If the venire is not ordered before chal-
lenges are exercised, this is the entire venire. If the venire is ordered, how-
ever, only the first 2j + x potential jurors (where j represents the number of 
peremptory challenges allocated to each side and x represents the size of the 
jury) actually have a chance of being selected. (To simplify matters, I will 
assume that x = 12 and that both sides have the same number of peremptory 
challenges.) Alternate jurors would complicate this analysis, since alter-
nates are typically selected in a second round, with each side given addi-
tional challenges, but the conclusions would be the same. 
  
 100 As discussed in Part II.A.3, a potential juror might be less likely to vote to convict as averaged 
across all cases, but more likely to vote to convict in a certain case or a certain class of cases. The prob-
ability model does not account for such case-specific factors. This is a key limitation of the model, and it 
is addressed in the binary model. See infra Part II.C. 
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For the unordered-venire selection method, the distribution of empa-
neled jurors can be calculated as follows. Let f(x) be the distribution of all 
potential jurors. (In the model, f(x) is the beta distribution with D  = 5 and 
E  = 4, as discussed above.) The probabilities of potential jurors voting to 
convict from any individual venire of size s can be sorted into order from 
smallest to largest and represented as X(1), X(2), . . . , X(s), where X(k) 
represents the kth-smallest probability and is called the kth order statistic of 
the venire. With an unordered venire, each juror has an equal probability of 
being selected (before challenges), so each side will eliminate the j least-
favorable members of the entire venire. The eliminated jurors are the jurors 
at each end of the sorted venire; those who remain are the middle jurors. 
Accordingly, jurors X(1), X(2), . . . , X(j) and X(s–j+1), X(s–j+2), . . . , X(s) will be 
struck. The remaining jurors—the jurors who might be selected—are X(j+1), 
X(j+2), . . . , X(s–j). 
The probability distributions of these remaining potential jurors’ like-
lihoods of voting to convict are the distributions of order statistics of the 
distribution f(x). The probability distribution of an order statistic X(k) is giv-
en by 
 
fX ( k ) (x)  
n!
(k 1)!(n  k)!
F(x) k1 1F(x) nk f (x) ,
  
where n is the total number of values of X (in this case, s) and F(x) is the 
cumulative distribution function for f(x). (For a probability distribution de-
fined over [0,1], F(x)  f (z)dz
0
x³ , defined for x in [0,1].) The distribution 
of empaneled jurors is the average of the distributions of X(j+1), X(j+2), . . . , 
X(s–j), which is given by 
 
fempaneled
unordered (x;s, j)  1
s2 j
(s2 j)!
(k 1)!(s2 j  k)!






Figure 2 shows an example of the distributions of order statistics for 
the remaining jurors. Figure 3 shows the resulting distribution of all empa-
neled jurors. As expected for a selection mechanism in which the potential 
jurors who are most and least likely to convict are eliminated, the distribu-
tion is substantially narrower than the distribution of all potential jurors. 
“Extreme” jurors are much less likely to serve than they would be if juries 
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
Figure 2. Juror order statistics. The probability distributions of potential jurors who are not 
challenged are shown for a specific selection mechanism. The distribution of all potential ju-
rors is the beta distribution with shape parameters a = 5 and b = 4; this is the distribution 
shown in Figure 1, supra. The venire size is forty-eight, and each side is allocated twelve pe-
remptory challenges, leaving the middle twenty-four potential jurors after peremptory chal-
lenges. Each of those potential jurors is represented by a probability distribution. The aver-
age of these twenty-four distributions, which is the distribution of all empaneled jurors, is 
shown in Figure 3, infra. 
The calculation of the distribution of jurors selected according to the 
ordered-venire method is similar. The differences are (1) the number of 
members of the effective venire varies with the number of peremptory chal-
lenges each side is allowed; and (2) the number of potential jurors who are 
not eliminated is fixed at twelve. With each side getting j peremptory chal-
lenges, the empaneled jurors will be the middle twelve jurors out of 2j + 12 
potential jurors. Accordingly, X(1), X(2), . . . , X(j) and X(j+13), X(j+14), . . . , 
X(2j+12) will be struck, and X(j+1), X(j+2), . . . , X(j+12) will be selected. This 
gives a distribution of empaneled jurors of 
 
fempaneled
ordered (x; j)  1
12
(122 j)!
( j  k 1)!(12 j  k)!





For both distributions of empaneled jurors, the standard deviation of 
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Figure 3. Probability distribution of empaneled jurors. Two distributions are shown. The 
broad (lighter) probability distribution shows all potential jurors, while the narrow (darker) 
probability distribution shows only those jurors who are not challenged. The selection me-
thod is the same as in Figure 2. Peremptory challenges result in a substantial narrowing of 
the jury pool, eliminating jurors at the extremes. The two distributions are not normalized; 
they are shown in different height scales to make comparison easier. 
V 2  E(X 2) (E(X))2 , to provide a measure of the ideological diversity of 
empaneled jurors.101 
3. Results of the Model 
The results of the model for several selection methods and numbers of 
peremptory challenges are summarized in Table 1. 
The first effect of peremptory challenges is that the asymmetry in the 
population of potential jurors is magnified as the proportion of peremptory 
challenges increases. According to this model, jurors selected by methods 
with more peremptory challenges are more likely to vote to convict than 
those selected with fewer peremptory challenges. (Of course, if the distribu-
tion of all potential jurors were flipped, juries selected with more perempto-
ry challenges would become less likely to vote to convict.) The average 
juror selected randomly has a 55.56% probability of voting to convict in a  
  
 101 For lack of a better term, I use ideology to refer to jurors’ willingness to convict or acquit, 
rather than to any underlying views. 
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to vote to 
convict 
Standard deviation 
of distribution of 
empaneled jurors 
Random selection 0 n/a 0.00 0.5556 0.1571 
3 per side, no set order 6 60 0.10 0.5569 0.1313 
6 per side, no set order 12 60 0.20 0.5577 0.1125 
12 per side, no set order 24 60 0.40 0.5587 0.0822 
18 per side, no set order 36 60 0.60 0.5593 0.0571 
3 per side, set order 6 18 0.33 0.5582 0.0897 
6 per side, set order 12 24 0.50 0.5589 0.0761 
12 per side, set order 24 36 0.67 0.5594 0.0542 
18 per side, set order 36 48 0.71 0.5595 0.0434 
Fully-struck jury from 60 48 60 0.80 0.5596 0.0368 
Table 1. Results of the probability model. The average likelihood that a juror will vote to 
convict and standard deviation of jurors is shown for several selection methods. As the ratio 
of peremptory challenges to effective venire size increases, the average juror’s likelihood of 
voting to convict likewise increases, and the standard deviation of empaneled jurors decreas-
es. These relationships are shown graphically in Figures 4 and 5. 
random case; the average juror selected according to the fully-struck-jury 
method from a venire of sixty has a 55.96% probability of voting to con-
vict. As the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire size increas-
es, the average empaneled juror’s probability of voting to convict increases. 
(This relationship is shown in Figure 4.) All else being equal, a jury se-
lected from this population using a method with no peremptory challenges 
should be less likely to convict than a jury selected using a method with 
many peremptory challenges. 
This result would be rather troubling, except that the difference in 
probabilities is so small, spanning less than half a percentage point in the 
model. This difference would affect the verdict only in the most borderline 
case. The magnitude of the change, however, is a function of the shape of 
the probability distribution, and since there is no reason to believe the ac-
tual population of potential jurors is best modeled by a beta distribution, the 
magnitude of this effect might be greater. 
This effect has a simple cause. A selection method with many peremp-
tory challenges eliminates potential jurors on either end of the spectrum and 
favors those jurors near the median of the population. Because the beta dis-
tribution is skewed to the right, its median is greater than its mean, so the 
average likelihood of voting to convict increases as jurors near the median 
are favored. (Indeed, for the beta distribution for Į = 5 and ȕ = 4, the mean 
is 0.5556 and the median is 0.5598.) The magnitude of the effect depends 
on the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire size because that is 
the fraction of potential jurors who are eliminated through peremptory chal-
lenges. The size of the change depends on how close the median and mean  
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Figure 4. Likelihood to convict as a function of peremptory challenges. As the number of pe-
remptory challenges for a given selection mechanism rises, the average juror selected be-
comes more likely to vote to convict. Each point represents a jury selection mechanism with 
a specific number of peremptory challenges. Square points represent selection from an unor-
dered venire of size sixty; diamond points represent selection from an ordered venire with up 
to twenty-four peremptory challenges per side. Although the two lines are not precisely the 
same, the trend is largely dependent on the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire 
size, not on the raw number of challenges. However, the magnitude of the effect is quite 
small, accounting for less than 0.5% of the probability that a random juror will vote to con-
vict. 
are for the population distribution; they are fairly close in the beta distribu-
tion used in the model, and so the shift in jury outcomes is small. For a 
more skewed population, the difference would be more significant102—and 
  
 102 This can be easily shown by comparing the results for the beta distribution used in the model to 
other possible distributions of potential jurors. The following table, for example, compares the change 
due to peremptory challenges in probability that an empaneled juror will vote to convict with the skew-
ness of the underlying distribution of all potential jurors, assuming that each side is allocated twenty-








voting to convict 
Empaneled jurors’ 
probability of 
voting to convict 
Change in probability 
of voting to convict 
Į = 5, ȕ = 4 –0.129 0.5556 0.5596 +0.0041 
Į = 5, ȕ = 3 –0.310 0.6250 0.6353 +0.0103 
Į = 5, ȕ = 2 –0.596 0.7143 0.7344 +0.0201 
Į = 5, ȕ = 1 –1.183 0.8333 0.8685 +0.0351 
As the populations of potential jurors become more skewed, the probability shift caused by the peremp-
tory challenges increases from less than half a percentage point to more than 3.5%. This is a much more 
significant shift, enough to affect approximately one in twenty-eight juror votes—or one vote every two 
or three trials. 
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the population of potential jurors in the United States may be strongly 
skewed toward conviction: 84% of juries in federal criminal jury trials con-
vict.103 
The second effect of peremptory challenges in the model is that the 
standard deviation of the individual jurors’ likelihood of voting to convict 
on any particular jury declines as the proportion of peremptory challenges 
increases. In other words, peremptory challenges make individual juries 
much more homogenous and much less ideologically diverse than juries 
selected randomly. Figure 5 illustrates the trend. 
This phenomenon has the same cause as the shift in average likelihood 
to convict: as prosecutors and defendants are allowed more peremptory 
challenges, they use them to eliminate more and more jurors at each end of 
the spectrum, leaving only those jurors at the median. Unlike the shift in 
average likelihood to convict, this effect is anything but minor, as Figure 6 
makes clear: juries selected according to methods with many peremptory 
challenges are uniformly concentrated in the middle of the population. In-
deed, a Monte Carlo simulation makes clear how large the effect is: the 
average jury selected with no peremptory challenges has members with 
probabilities of voting to convict ranging from 29.8% to 80.0%, while the 
average jury selected according to the fully-struck-jury method with twen-
ty-four peremptory challenges per side varies only between 52.0% and 
59.9%. Among 5,000 such simulated fully struck juries, no single juror was 
chosen with a probability of less than 41.8% or greater than 69.4%. When 
the parties are allocated many peremptory challenges, whole swaths of po-
tential jurors—those who are not in the very middle of the jury pool—are 
essentially eliminated from ever serving. This effect does not depend on the 
shape of the population or of the model chosen; for all distributions, poten-
tial jurors near the median are much more likely to serve than those farther 
away. This is a fundamental shift away from the idea that juries are to be 
chosen from a “fair cross-section of the community.”104 
 
  
 103 See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U.  L.Q. 151, 
152 (2005). This shift, of course, is not necessarily problematic. Prosecutors should only bring cases in 
which they believe the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But since defendants plead guilty 
in most cases, it is very difficult to know whether most defendants who go to trial are guilty or not. 
These considerations are discussed in Part III.A. 
 104 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (holding that a jury-selection procedure that 
made women much less likely to be selected unconstitutionally deprived Taylor of his right to trial by a 
jury selected from a fair cross section of the community). The Court limited the fair-cross-section re-
quirement in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990), holding that although a jury must be selected 
from a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community, an individual jury need not be repre-
sentative. There is a significant difference, though, between saying the Constitution does not guarantee a 
representative jury in an individual case, and saying the Constitution permits procedures that effectively 
exclude large swaths of potential jurors from ever serving and make representative juries vanishingly 
unlikely to be selected. 
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Figure 5. Ideological diversity as a function of peremptory challenges. As the number of pe-
remptory challenges for a given selection mechanism rises, the standard deviation of the dis-
tribution of empaneled jurors falls. Square points represent examples of selection from an 
unordered venire of size sixty; diamond points represent selection from an ordered venire 
with up to twenty-four peremptory challenges per side. 
In summary, two effects of peremptory challenges can be shown using 
the probability model. Peremptory challenges cause the average empaneled 
juror’s likelihood of voting to convict to shift from the mean to the median 
of the population. For many populations this shift will be minor, though 
without information about the population’s distribution it is impossible to 
know how large the effect will be. Peremptory challenges also cause juries 
to be much less ideologically diverse, as individual jurors far from the pop-
ulation’s median are much less likely to be selected. This effect is extreme-
ly large: the standard deviation in the model of jurors selected with twenty-
four peremptory challenges per side (out of a venire of sixty potential ju-
rors) is less than one quarter the standard deviation of randomly selected 
jurors. Moreover, this effect should be large for most or all distributions of 
potential jurors. The result is that jurors are exposed to a much lesser varie-







 105 See infra Part III.B. 
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Figure 6. Decreasing diversity in juries selected with more peremptory challenges. Histo-
grams of four juries are shown. These juries were selected using the unordered-venire me-
thod from the same venire of sixty potential jurors, generated from the beta distribution used 
in the model. Four juries were chosen, using increasing numbers of peremptory challenges: 
(1) random selection; and (2)-(4) six, twelve, and twenty-four peremptory challenges per 
side, respectively. 
C. A Binary Model of Jurors and Jury Selection 
1. Motivating the Model 
The probability model has a significant limitation: it cannot account 
for case-specific factors that determine an individual juror’s likelihood to 
vote to convict. Ignoring these factors may be reasonable in some cases, but 
often attorneys will have information (whether individual or demographic) 
about a potential juror that sheds light on that juror’s likely vote in a specif-
ic case. In the extreme, an attorney would have enough information about 
every potential juror to predict his or her vote. The binary model assumes 
that this is the case, so we can investigate what happens as attorneys be-
come increasingly good at predicting potential jurors’ votes. 
The model divides the population of potential jurors into two groups of 
indeterminate size: those who would vote to convict and those who would 
vote to acquit. This is the only characteristic distinguishing potential jurors. 
Prosecutors will, when possible, use peremptory challenges on potential 
jurors who would vote to acquit (and vice versa for defense attorneys); at-
torneys are indifferent, however, between potential jurors who would vote 
the same way. 
As a consequence of this indifference, the composition of the empa-
neled jury is fully determined by two variables: the composition of the ef-
fective venire (i.e., how many potential jurors would vote to convict and 
acquit) and the selection method. For example, if each side is allowed 
twelve peremptory challenges and the venire is ordered, then only the first 
thirty-six potential jurors might get selected; if that group has twenty jurors 
who would vote to convict and sixteen who would vote to acquit, then each 
side will strike twelve opposing jurors, and the jury will be divided, before 
deliberations, 8-4 in favor of conviction. If the venire is divided 27-9, how-
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ever, one side will be able to challenge all nine opposing potential jurors; 
the jury will be aligned 12-0. (For unordered selection methods with extra 
potential jurors, there is a degree of randomness after challenges have been 
exercised.) The distribution of jury compositions thus follows from the dis-
tribution of venire compositions, which can be calculated according to the 
binomial theorem. 
2. Constructing and Applying the Model 
The model divides the population of potential jurors into those who 
would vote to convict and acquit. Call those groups A and B, with group A 
representing those who would vote to convict. (This terminology will come 
in handy in Part II.C.4, infra, which expands the model.) Let s represent the 
size of the effective venire (i.e., the number of potential jurors who might 
get selected) and p represent the probability that an individual potential 
juror is a member of group A (i.e., the proportion of the population in group 
A). Applying the binomial theorem, the probability that the venire will con-
tain k members of group A is given by 
 
f (k;s, p)  s!
k!(s k)!
pk (1 p)sk .
 
 
Determining the probability distribution of juries’ compositions is 
more complicated, because there are several ways to get a jury split 12-0 in 
one direction or the other. A jury will have zero members from group A if 
the venire has anywhere from zero to j members, where j is the number of 
peremptory challenges allocated to each side. Similarly, if there are j or 
fewer members of group B on the venire, the jury will have twelve mem-
bers of group A. For an ordered venire, then, the probability that the jury 
will have k members from group A is 
 
f jury
ordered (k; j, p)  
(122 j)!
n!(122 j  n)!
pn (1 p)122 jn ,
n 0
j
¦ for k = 0
(122 j)!
( j  k)!(12 j  k)!
p jk (1 p)12 jk , for 1d k d11
(122 j)!
(12 j  n)!( j  n)!
p12 jn (1 p) jn ,
n 0
j













Calculating the probability distribution of juries selected from unor-
dered venires is yet more complicated. The breakdown between groups A 
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and B of potential jurors left after challenges have been exercised is deter-
mined by the composition of the venire and the number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The jury is chosen randomly from those remaining jurors, however, 
and this random choice adds a second binomial step to the calculation. The 
result is a set of thirteen summations, some of them summations of summa-
tions. Some sample calculations not reproduced here confirm that, as in the 
first model, by far the dominant factor is the ratio of peremptory challenges 
to effective venire size. Since the added complexity introduced by the unor-
dered selection process does not yield any additional insights, to simplify 
the analysis, this model will use only the ordered selection method. 
In addition to the average number of members of group A on a jury, 
two more statistics are calculated. First, the probability that a jury will be 
badly lopsided in favor of the majority, with at least ten members drawn 
from group A, is given by 
 
f1012
ordered ( j, p)  
(122 j)!
( j  n)!(12 j  n)!





(12 j  n)!( j  n)!






This gives another measure of the degree to which peremptory chal-
lenges change jury composition. Second, the probability that a jury will be 
badly lopsided in favor of the minority—with at least 10 members drawn 
from group B—is given by 
 
f02
ordered ( j, p)  
(122 j)!
n!(122 j  n)!





( j  n)!(12 j  n)!






Considered together, these two measures give a sense of how ideologi-
cally diverse individual juries are. 
3. Results of the Model 
The results of the binary model largely mirror the results of the proba-
bility model. As in the probability model, peremptory challenges magnify 
asymmetries in the population. These results are shown in Table 2 for sev-
eral sample selection methods and breakdowns of the population. 
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Average number of jurors from group A 
(p = percent of population in group A) 
p = 51% p = 55% p = 65% p = 75% 
Random selection 0 0.00 6.12 6.60 7.80 9.00 
3 per side, set order 6 0.33 6.18 6.90 8.67 10.32 
6 per side, set order 12 0.50 6.24 7.18 9.44 11.17 
12 per side, set order 24 0.67 6.35 7.70 10.55 11.83 
18 per side, set order 36 0.75 6.44 8.15 11.20 11.97 
24 per side, set order 48 0.80 6.53 8.54 11.56 11.99 
36 per side, set order 72 0.86 6.68 9.17 11.87 12.00 
Table 2. Results of the binary model. The average breakdown of juries is shown for several 
selection methods and populations of potential jurors. As the ratio of peremptory challenges 
to effective venire size increase, the average number of jurors selected from the majority 
likewise increases. This relationship is shown in Figure 7. 
The effect is much larger in the binary model than in the beta distribu-
tion model. For instance, when 55% of the population belongs to group A, 
then the average jury selected randomly (i.e., with no peremptory chal-
lenges) contains 6.6 members of group A and 5.4 members of group B. If 
each side exercises twenty-four peremptory challenges and the jury is se-
lected from an ordered venire, however, an average of 8.5 members come 
from group A. And the effect is even more extreme when the population is 
split 65-35: randomly selected juries average 7.8 members of group A, 
while juries selected with each side exercising twenty-four peremptory 
challenges average 11.6 members from group A. Peremptory challenges can 
turn a dominant majority into an overwhelming majority and nearly elimi-
nate members of the minority. If a majority of potential jurors will convict, 
then in cases with the most peremptory challenges—which tend to be cases 
involving the most serious crimes—peremptory challenges may cause the 
jury to have no members who are skeptical of the government’s case. The 
rather extreme nature of the effect is shown in Figure 7. 
It is not surprising that the effect is more dramatic in this model than 
in the probability model: attorneys in this model have much greater infor-
mation about potential jurors, because the probability model assumes that 
attorneys rely only on factors unrelated to the specific case that attorney is 
trying. This added information should allow for more tailored use of chal-
lenges, magnifying their effects. Just as before, peremptory challenges shift 
the jury toward the median juror; here the median juror’s vote is known, 
and likely to be guilty. (And as before, if the population distribution were 
reversed such that the majority of potential jurors would vote to acquit, 
empaneled jurors would likewise become more likely to vote to acquit as 




File: FORD - Galley Proof v4.doc Created on:  12/1/2009 5:47:00 PM Last Printed: 12/1/2009 8:39:00 PM 
410 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 17:2 
 
Figure 7. Dominance of the majority as a function of peremptory challenges. As the ratio of 
peremptory challenges to effective venire size increases, the average number of members of 
the majority group (group A) increases. Data are shown for seven divisions of the population: 
the proportions in the majority (i.e., p) from bottom to top are 51%, 53%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 
70%, and 75%. 
Figure 8 shows another way of seeing this effect: as the ratio of pe-
remptory challenges to effective venire size increases, many more juries 
become badly lopsided and dominated by members of group A. This is true 
even when the population is relatively evenly divided. For example, when 
the population is split 60-40 and each side gets thirty-six peremptory chal-
lenges (a large but not unheard-of number),106 86% of juries have at least 
ten members from group A. Indeed, even when the population is split exact-
ly evenly, peremptory challenges cause badly lopsided juries, as can be 
seen in Figure 9. When the population is split 50-50 and each side gets thir-
ty-six peremptory challenges, 22% of juries have two or fewer members of 
group A and 22% have ten or more. Nearly half of all such juries, then, are 
badly divided in one direction or the other, even though the population of 








 106 See supra note 29. 
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Figure 8. Dominance of the majority as a function of peremptory challenges: another view. 
As the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire size increases, the proportion of ju-
ries dominated by members of group A increases. Data are shown for eight divisions of the 
population: the proportions in the majority (i.e., p) from bottom to top are 50%, 51%, 53%, 
55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75%. Even when the population is split exactly 50–50, perempto-
ry challenges cause many more juries to be dominated by one group or the other. 
The net result of these effects is that peremptory challenges reduce di-
versity on juries, but increase second-order diversity, since a single selec-
tion method becomes much more likely to produce wildly different juries as 
the number of peremptory challenges increases. 
In summary, two effects of peremptory challenges can be shown using 
the binary model. First, as in the previous model, peremptory challenges 
cause juries to be increasingly dominated by jurors near the median of the 
population. This means that if a majority of the population would vote to 
convict, juries will be even more dominated by jurors who would vote to 
convict than would occur by chance. This is a large effect that applies to all 
populations. Second, also as in the first model, peremptory challenges cause 
juries to be less ideologically diverse: juries are much more likely to be 
dominated by one kind of juror. When a substantial majority of the popula-
tion would vote to convict, juries are much more likely to be dominated by 
that group. When the population is evenly divided or nearly so, however, 
the dominant majority can be for conviction or acquittal. And second-order 
jury diversity is also increased as the number of peremptory challenges 
increases. These latter two effects make juries less predictable and increase 
the risks of trial. 
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Figure 9. Dominance of the minority as a function of peremptory challenges. As the ratio of 
peremptory challenges to effective venire size increases, the proportion of juries dominated 
by members of group B increases—but only for relatively evenly divided populations. Data 
are shown for five divisions of the population: the proportions in the majority (i.e., p) from 
bottom to top are 60%, 55%, 53%, 51%, and 50%. 
4. Demographic Diversity 
The probability model discussed in Part II.B, supra, has another short-
coming: it makes no assumptions about the demographic makeup of the 
population and so cannot predict what effect peremptory challenges have on 
jury demographics. While it may be the case that peremptory challenges 
reduce demographic diversity just as they reduce ideological diversity, test-
ing this with the probability model requires a theory of how demographics 
relate to likelihood of voting to convict. 
The binary model can be adapted to investigate demographic diversity 
by treating groups A and B as potential jurors from different demographic 
groups instead of potential jurors with different votes. This version of the 
model makes two assumptions. First, it assumes that the population can be 
divided into two groups, with every potential juror belonging to one group 
or the other. These groups can represent any binary characteristics: white 
versus minority, male versus female, rich versus poor, liberal versus con-
servative. Second, the model assumes that in a particular jury trial one side 
wants to eliminate members of one group, while the other side wants to 
eliminate members of the other group. (So in a rape trial, for example, the 
prosecution might want to eliminate male jurors while the defense might 
want to eliminate female jurors; in a racial discrimination lawsuit, the plain-
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tiff may want to eliminate white jurors while the defendant wants to elimi-
nate minority jurors.)107 
The results of this version of the model are the same as in Part II.C.3, 
supra: peremptory challenges increase the representation of median jurors 
(i.e., jurors from the majority group) at the expense of jurors from the mi-
nority group. This decreases the diversity of individual juries, this time with 
respect to demographics rather than votes. The effect remains strong. For 
example, if the two demographic groups are white jurors and minority ju-
rors, and one side wants to eliminate all minority jurors (for instance, if race 
is a major issue in the case), then the effect is likely to be an all-white jury 
if white potential jurors are a majority.108 
This is not surprising—indeed, Batson and its successors are premised 
on the idea that peremptory challenges can decrease the representation of 
demographic groups, especially minority groups, on juries.109 But as in Part 
II.C.3, supra, the result holds even when the population is split evenly or 
nearly so, as with gender. Peremptory challenges make lopsided juries 
much more likely than if juries were selected randomly. In a trial in which 
gender could matter (a sex discrimination case, say, or a rape trial), peremp-
tory challenges make both all-female and all-male juries more likely, and 
thus make trials much more unpredictable. 
D. Summary of Results 
The results described for both models grow out of two effects inherent 
in the peremptory challenge process. First, peremptory challenges make 
potential jurors near the median much more likely to be selected, and out-
liers much less likely. And second, peremptory challenges magnify the ef-
fects of random variations in the venire. Both of these effects increase as 
the proportion of potential jurors eliminated through peremptory challenges 
(i.e., the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire size) increases. 
  
 107 These assumptions are rather simplistic compared to the real world, of course. Race, for in-
stance, is not an either-or choice; age and politics are still more slippery, since they represent conti-
nuums rather than discrete characteristics. Likewise, an attorney will probably not want to eliminate 
every member of one gender or race or age group; individualistic consideration is inevitable (and proba-
bly worth encouraging). But empirical studies suggest that demographics can have predictive power—
sometimes strikingly so. See, e.g., Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, supra note 69, at 264-66; Feild, supra 
note 69, at 73, 75-77; Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social 
Science, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 22-23 (2005); Fulero & Penrod, supra note 47, at 244-48; 
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9-14 (1997). 
 108 Of course, such targeting of potential jurors based solely on race is unconstitutional under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). 
 109 The model does suggest that this may be a natural result of peremptory challenges when demo-
graphics can help predict votes, rather than simple racism or sexism by attorneys. 
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Considering these effects and the results of the models, two conclusions can 
be drawn. 
First, peremptory challenges can cause systematic shifts in the average 
likelihood an empaneled juror will vote to convict—and thus, potentially, in 
jury verdicts. The most dramatic shifts require attorneys to have excellent 
information about the potential jurors and require substantial asymmetries 
in the population of potential jurors; otherwise, only relatively minor shifts 
have been shown. Nevertheless, when those conditions are met, giving each 
side a relatively large number of peremptory challenges can essentially de-
termine the outcome of a trial. And because potential jurors in the United 
States seem to be strongly skewed in favor of conviction,110 this shift almost 
certainly favors conviction. 
Second, peremptory challenges can reduce ideological and demo-
graphic diversity within individual juries. This makes juries less representa-
tive of a cross section of the community and more representative of the 
median juror. Because attorneys will always care about jurors’ votes, this 
effect should apply in all cases to ideological diversity, and to demographic 
diversity in all cases in which demographics have predictive power. Unlike 
the first conclusion, this effect is strong regardless of the model used or the 
shape of the population distribution. But while individual juries become 
less diverse as peremptory challenges increase, juries show greater second-
order diversity, with greater variations between juries. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
These findings have a number of policy implications for both courts 
and legislators as they implement systems of jury selection. 
A. Changing Votes 
The most obviously troubling implication follows from changes, 
caused by peremptory challenges, to the likelihood that a juror will vote to 
convict. Consider a defendant who would not be convicted by a jury se-
lected randomly but is convicted by a jury selected with peremptory chal-
lenges. The defendant might be guilty: perhaps most defendants are guilty, 
and more jurors are overly skeptical than overly credulous of prosecutors. 
Then peremptory challenges would merely be favoring more accurate out-
comes. But the converse is also possible. Without data about how many 
defendants who go to trial are actually guilty and about how likely potential 
  
 110 See Leipold, supra note 103, at 151-52. 
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jurors are to vote to convict, neither of which exist, it is impossible to know 
which is the case.111 
Accordingly, when a jury convicts in a case where many potential ju-
rors would not convict, and that conviction comes because the selection 
procedure systematically excluded those potential jurors, it is difficult to 
know which outcome is “correct”: the guilty verdict from the jury selected 
after peremptory challenges, or the not-guilty verdict that might have been 
delivered without peremptory challenges. The legitimacy of a verdict ren-
dered after peremptory challenges is thus dubious for several reasons. 
First, the burden of justifying peremptory challenges is on proponents. 
The Supreme Court has made clear there is no constitutional right to pe-
remptory challenges,112 and though they have a long history in American 
and British courts, the fact that they have been around so long without any-
one mounting a convincing argument in their favor suggests there is no 
persuasive justification. 
Second, the systematic shift toward conviction that peremptory chal-
lenges can cause is inconsistent with the rights of trial by an impartial jury 
and trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, both of 
which (unlike peremptory challenges) are guaranteed by the Constitution.113 
Though the Constitution is not specific about what an “impartial” jury is, 
systematically selecting for jurors more likely to convict is at odds with 
most conceptions of impartiality. Moreover, it casts doubt on the verdict 
when a conviction is due, in part, to the jury selection procedure used.  
Third, though the data are far from conclusive, there are limited indi-
cations that suggest randomly selected juries might be correct more often 
than juries selected after peremptory challenges—and thus that peremptory 
challenges may cause wrongful convictions. The vast majority of criminal 
defendants plead guilty: between October 2003 and September 2004, 
72,152 defendants pleaded guilty in federal courts, while only 3,346 went to 
trial and only 2,630 were convicted after trial.114 Though a number of fac-
tors influence a defendant’s decision to go to trial, the Sentencing Guide-
lines provide a substantial reduction in recommended sentence for a defen-
dant who pleads guilty, confesses guilt, and cooperates with the prosecu-
  
 111 Data about how many juries convict do exist, from which one could make limited inferences 
about the population of potential jurors. See id. at 151-53. But there is no good source of data about how 
many defendants are actually guilty; conclusions based on trial outcomes would be circular, since the 
goal would be to figure out if trial outcomes are correct. 
 112 United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000). 
 113 See U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”). 
 114 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 59, 75 
tbl.5.3 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.  
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tion.115 Defendants who go to trial are therefore likely to believe their odds 
of being acquitted are large enough to justify forfeiting the benefits of 
pleading guilty—because they are not guilty, or because the evidence of 
guilt is weak, or because they cannot rationally evaluate the strength of the 
government’s case. Some innocent defendants make it through to trial—no 
prosecutor’s office is perfect—and because most defendants plead guilty, 
innocent defendants could make up a significant fraction of those who go to 
trial even if they make up a small portion of charged defendants. 
Moreover, at the federal level at least, trial judges are significantly less 
likely than trial juries to convict: from 1989 to 2002, the jury trial convic-
tion rate was 84%, while judges convicted in just 55% of bench trials.116 As 
repeat players who are able to evaluate the strength of the evidence compa-
ratively in multiple cases and are presumably experts at weighing evidence 
and drawing factual inferences, trial judges may be more likely than juries 
to be correct. And since it is likely that these juries are convicting more 
often than randomly selected juries would (because the pool of potential 
jurors seems skewed toward conviction), randomly selected juries (which 
would convict less often) might be more often correct. 
It is worth emphasizing that cases in which peremptory challenges af-
fect the outcome are almost certainly not the norm. Prosecutors presumably 
do not bring cases unless they feel the evidence for guilt is convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt; borderline cases—the kind most likely to be 
affected by peremptory challenges—may be rare. Still, we should care 
about their effects. Peremptory challenges are most important when they 
are used in the greatest numbers. And states typically award more peremp-
tory challenges in the most severe cases, so it is precisely the cases where 
the most is at stake, and where society has the greatest reasons to avoid 
incorrect verdicts, in which peremptory challenges have their greatest influ-
ence.117 
B. Jury Diversity 
The other significant finding of this Article is the degree to which pe-
remptory challenges can reduce diversity on juries. Modern jury selection 
procedures were designed to empanel a broad cross section of the commu-
nity and avoid the homogeneity that resulted from earlier “blue ribbon” 
  
 115 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, at 351 (2006), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/CHAP3.pdf.  
 116 See Leipold, supra note 103, at 152. 
 117  Of course, the difference could be caused by substantive differences between cases in which the 
parties agree to a bench trial and those that go to a jury. 
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selection procedures.118 This reform does limited good, however, if peremp-
tory challenges permit homogeneity to creep back onto juries. Empirical 
evidence backs up this concern.119 The models developed in this Article 
confirm that this result is not merely a function of attorneys’ reliance on 
stereotypes of potential jurors, but may instead be an inevitable result of the 
peremptory challenge procedure. 
Why does internal diversity of juries matter? First, jury deliberation 
would be useless if jurors did not influence each other. Ideally that influ-
ence would be in the realm of fact finding rather than bargaining: jurors 
should point out problems and inconsistencies in testimony, employ their 
real-world experiences, and generally apply their different backgrounds and 
thought processes to the facts of the case, so that the likelihood of settling 
on the “right” outcome is maximized. Jurors’ biases and viewpoints will of 
course play a role in this deliberation: a juror who is 20% likely to vote to 
convict will inevitably have a different view of the evidence than one who 
is 80% likely to convict. Differences in demographics are potentially as 
relevant as ideological differences: studies suggest, for example, that men 
and women employ qualitatively different types of logical reasoning in de-
ciding moral dilemmas.120 
Obviously, the outcome of any deliberative process depends substan-
tially on the views of the participants at the outset. There is increasing evi-
dence, though, that group deliberations have a large effect as well: for ex-
ample, the views of a non-diverse group—that is, a group whose members 
largely share the same outlook—tend to become more extreme than they 
were at the beginning of the deliberation.121 That is to say, a group whose 
members were predisposed to convict will, when put together, convict even 
more often than the numbers would indicate ex ante. Just as peremptory 
challenges can systematically shift a jury’s average likelihood of voting to 
convict, homogeneity can shift a jury even further. Diversity protects 
against this sort of distortion. 
While peremptory challenges decrease the diversity within individual 
juries, they increase the second-order diversity of juries, leading to lopsided 
juries and other unusually composed juries. That this can happen even when 
the population of potential jurors is equally balanced or nearly so (as, for 
  
 118 See, e.g., 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.2(b) (2d ed. Supp. 1999); 
VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 14-18. 
 119 See, e.g., Johnson & Haney, supra note 74, at 499-500 (observing that the jury selection process 
in California state courts reduced jury diversity, compared to the pool of potential jurors). 
 120 See Fowler, supra note 107, at 16-20. 
 121 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 
118-19 (2000). Studies have come to similar conclusions about the size of damage awards by civil 
juries, see David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The 
Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1172-73 (2000), and votes by federal appellate judges, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 352-53 (2004). 
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example, with gender) is particularly troubling. Numerous studies have 
documented differences in male jurors’ and female jurors’ willingness to 
convict in certain types of cases.122 One study, for example, found that 
women were much more willing than men to vote to convict in rape cas-
es.123 This increased willingness to convict showed up in the ultimate ver-
dicts, though, only when women made up “an overwhelming majority” of 
the jury—ten or more out of twelve jurors.124 And unanimity rules and hol-
douts notwithstanding, a jury that is divided 11-1 or 10-2 is much more 
likely than one divided 6-6 or 7-5 to reach the verdict favored by the major-
ity.125 Giving each side a large number of peremptory challenges makes 
such lopsided juries—in either direction—much more likely than if juries 
were selected randomly, and so renders jury verdicts more unpredictable 
and less trustworthy. 
There may nevertheless be good reasons to favor this bargain between 
first-order and second-order diversity. Heather Gerken suggests that in-
creased second-order diversity reflects juries’ institutional role—that “each 
individual jury is best understood as one part of a larger institution that es-
tablishes what the law is.”126 But while this account would help explain why 
juries are selected according to a randomized procedure rather than engi-
neered to be diverse in the individual case,127 it only works if those selection 
procedures nonetheless ensure that the population is fairly represented in 
the aggregate pool of empaneled juries.128 This Article suggests, however, 
that peremptory challenges are making such equal representation less likely, 
not more. Any benefits of increasing the second-order diversity of juries by 
increasing the number of peremptory challenges is thus likely outweighed 
by the costs. 
There is another reason diversity matters. The models discussed in Part 
II are vastly simplified: they assume a single dimension along which all 
jurors are arranged. Jurors, though, differ in many ways: every juror has his 
or her own set of knowledge and life experience, and these inform that ju-
ror’s perspective on the evidence. Those perspectives are critically impor-
tant parts of jurors’ decision-making processes. As Mark Cammack has 
written: 
  
 122 See Fowler, supra note 107, at 21-22 (describing studies). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 22. 
 125 See Gerken, supra note 96, at 1125. 
 126 Id. at 1186. 
 127 Cf. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional 
right to a diverse jury in an individual case); Gerken, supra note 96, at 1185-87. 
 128 Cf. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480 (“The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the 
venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an 
impartial one (which it does).”); Gerken, supra note 96, at 1186. 
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[Jurors] actively construct representations of the trial evidence based on their prior expecta-
tions about what constitutes an adequate explanation of the litigated event. Furthermore, 
these representations, rather than the original “raw” evidence, form the basis of the jurors’ fi-
nal decision. Thus, the jurors’ prior assumptions about the nature of the social world are an 
important ingredient of the jury’s verdict. Because jurors’ beliefs about the world inescapa-
bly influence the way they perform their function, those beliefs cannot be ignored in the 
process of formulating rules for jury selection.129 
Cammack goes on to describe two studies that concluded that the credibility 
a listener assigns to a story is essentially unrelated to the evidence for the 
story.130 Instead, individuals base their credibility assessments mostly on the 
plausibility of the narrative’s structure, given listeners’ backgrounds: “the 
credibility of a story depends largely on its structural plausibility.”131 
The plausibility of a story, though, depends on one’s perspective and 
one’s experience with the subject matter of the story.132 Consider a high- 
school student charged with burglary during school hours who has a truth-
ful alibi. If the defendant was absent from school the day of the burglary, a 
corporate executive may take that to mean that something illicit was going 
on and thus disregard the defendant’s alibi. A juror whose background and 
experience is similar to the defendant’s might consider the alibi more plaus-
ible and assign more credibility to the story. Similarly, jurors who lack ex-
perience in the corporate world may be wholly unequipped to evaluate evi-
dence of accounting fraud. Diversity of experiences increases the accuracy 
of jury fact finding by increasing the range of experiences that jurors will 
be able to use to evaluate the plausibility of the evidence. 
C. Recommendations 
For the greatest confidence in jury verdicts, states should reduce the 
influence peremptory challenges have on jury composition. This means 
reducing the ratio of peremptory challenges to effective venire size. 
This is especially important in situations where attorneys have access 
to considerable information about potential jurors. Though the binary and 
beta distribution models give consistent results, the magnitudes are quite 
different. In the beta distribution model, the average empaneled juror’s 
probability of voting to convict is increased, but not by much; in the binary 
model, it can change substantially. The difference is that only attorneys in 
  
 129 Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 462-63 (1995). 
 130 See id. at 467-73. 
 131 Id. at 469. 
 132 Phoebe Ellsworth identified three parts of the deliberative process that can be influenced by 
juror beliefs, attitudes, and experiences: the evaluation of witnesses, inferences drawn from evidence, 
and the nature of the juror’s “personal standard-of-proof” for conviction. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some 
Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION 
MAKING 42, 58 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). 
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the binary model have access to full information, including case-specific 
information, about potential jurors.133 
There are different ways to reduce the influence of peremptory chal-
lenges. The number of peremptory challenges allocated to each side could 
be reduced. There may be a good reason for variance between states, but 
there is no justification for Connecticut giving each side twenty-five pe-
remptory challenges in death-penalty cases134 while Virginia finds four per 
side sufficient.135 Alternatively or additionally, the effective venire size 
could be increased, either by directly increasing the venire size or by 
switching from an ordered selection procedure to an unordered procedure. 
If eighty potential jurors are called for a trial and each side is allotted ten 
challenges, then peremptory challenges eliminate 25% of the potential ju-
rors who have any chance of being empaneled (twenty of eighty) in an un-
ordered selection system, as compared with 62.5% (twenty of thirty-two) in 
an ordered selection system. The same number of peremptory challenges 
accounts for a much greater percentage of the effective pool in an ordered 
system. 
The different results of the models make clear that reducing the 
amount of information attorneys have would also reduce the influence of 
peremptory challenges. It would likely have other negative consequences, 
however, such as increasing attorneys’ reliance on discrimination and on 
demographic variables.136 
One difficulty in reducing the influence of peremptory challenges is 
that they are frequently easier to add than to subtract. Though it is clear that 
there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, there usually is a 
statutory right to a specific number of challenges. Allowing more chal-
lenges usually does not violate such a right, while allowing fewer does. And 
lawyers are much more likely to complain about being deprived of chal-
lenges than about being given extra opportunities to shape the jury, even if 
it means extra opportunities for the other side. These factors can act as a 
one-way ratchet, increasing the influence of peremptory challenges. 
An alternative approach could be to encourage widespread adoption of 
rules giving defendants more peremptory challenges than prosecutors re-
ceive. Some jurisdictions have embraced this approach: this is the standard 
in non-capital felonies in federal courts,137 for example, though most states 
do not award defendants extra peremptory challenges.138 The approach 
  
 133 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 132 ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 12, at 228 tbl.41. 
 135 Id.  
 136 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Informa-
tion, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1688-94 (2008). 
 137 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (allocating six peremptory challenges to prosecutors, and ten to 
defendants, in non-capital felony trials). 
 138 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
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would embrace the feeling of control that can make peremptory challenges 
attractive to attorneys, but it has little else to recommend it, since it would 
merely offset one bias with a different kind of bias. Accordingly, it would 
be hard to calibrate to ensure that it does not introduce other problems. 
Some of the proposed changes would be easy to implement; others 
would be quite difficult. Different decision makers control different steps of 
the jury selection process. The number of challenges is usually set by sta-
tute, while trial judges often have discretion to vary the specifics of the se-
lection procedure. Venire size may be up to the judge or may be controlled 
by the clerk. And some changes are more transparent than others. If there is 
political opposition to reducing the number of peremptory challenges, for 
example because lawyers like exercising them or think they help protect 
defendants’ rights,139 much of the same result can be accomplished through 
a seemingly innocuous procedural change to an unordered selection system. 
There may be good reasons to keep some peremptory challenges. They 
can help exclude the occasional nutty juror, and they may help make defen-
dants believe trials are fair. The same result can often be accomplished 
through challenges for cause, but peremptory challenges can provide a use-
ful backup if a judge erroneously denies a challenge for cause and one side 
strongly believes the potential juror is biased or unable to evaluate the evi-
dence impartially. (Though judges might take challenges for cause more 
seriously without that backup.) But that just requires a few peremptory chal-
lenges—not the 10 or 20 or more per side that are common today. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has aimed to determine what happens when attorneys ex-
ercise peremptory challenges effectively: rationally, with relevant informa-
tion about potential jurors, and without discriminating based on animus. 
The models demonstrate that peremptory challenges systematically increase 
the representation of jurors near the median of the jury pool. This means 
that the average empaneled juror’s likelihood of voting to convict can be 
systematically changed, likely in favor of conviction. The models also show 
that internal ideological and demographic diversity of individual juries can 
be systematically reduced, while second-order diversity of juries is in-
creased. Each jury has more in common than before, but different juries 
may be very dissimilar. The magnitudes of these effects increase as the 
number of peremptory challenges increases, as ordered selection procedures 
are employed, and as attorneys have access to more complete information 
about potential jurors. 
  
 139 See, e.g., Brief of National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 4-7, Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009) (No. 07-9995), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEX-
IS 1064. 
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These findings cast significant doubt on the argument that peremptory 
challenges help create juries that are more impartial than randomly selected 
juries. Using unordered selection procedures and reducing the amount of 
information available about potential jurors would reduce, but not elimi-
nate, the problem. Accordingly, courts and legislatures should consider 
limiting or eliminating peremptory challenges. 
 
